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APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING
POLICY DECISIONS AFTER KIMBROUGH
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court drastically altered appellate review of
federal sentencing decisions in United States v. Booker.1 Booker held that the
once-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, and it
instructed the appellate courts to review all district court sentencing decisions
for ―reasonableness‖—a virtually unknown standard of appellate review. 2
After the decision in Booker, several circuit splits developed over how to
conduct this new form of appellate review, and the Court heard a series of
cases to resolve these conflicts. One of these post-Booker cases, Kimbrough
v. United States,3 involved a district court‘s authority to sentence a defendant
outside of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement with the
policy underlying the crack cocaine Guideline. Although obviously intended
to clarify appellate review, the Court‘s opinion in Kimbrough has actually led
to additional confusion and created new circuit conflicts.4
The Court‘s recent federal sentencing cases, beginning with Booker,
resemble a tightrope act: The Court is endeavoring to walk a fine line between
district court sentencing discretion and preserving some adherence to the
Guidelines through appellate review. 5 Because appellate review is, by its
terms, a limit on district court discretion, the Court‘s post-Booker sentencing
jurisprudence is inherently contradictory. 6 The Court has tried to ensure that
* Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O‘Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University. J.D., Yale Law School. B.A., Columbia University. Thank you to the participants and
attendees at the Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and Future Conference, which Marquette University
Law School hosted on June 15 and 16, 2009. Thanks also to Jelani Jefferson Exum, Andy Hessick,
Mary Sigler, Judy Stinson, and Doug Sylvester for their helpful comments on this project, and to
Amy Coughenour for her research assistance.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 245, 261.
3. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
4. See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 327 (2008)
[hereinafter Leading Cases] (―Kimbrough . . . illustrated and arguably increased the post-Booker
tension between mandatory and indeterminate sentencing.‖).
5. See id. at 330 (noting ―the tension between mandatory and advisory sentencing created by
the Booker remedy‖).
6. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60
ALA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2008) (―The Booker remedy is fundamentally schizophrenic in that it attempts to
increase district court discretion in order to avoid Sixth Amendment problems, but at the same time it
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district courts continue to sentence according to the Guidelines, but at the
same time it has said that the Guidelines are not mandatory. To date, the
Court has attempted to ensure district court compliance with the Guidelines
through appellate review. 7 But, because strict appellate review would
ultimately eliminate district court discretion, the Court has had to twist the
appellate process8 and issue opinions, like Kimbrough, that contain facially
inconsistent statements.9 Kimbrough tells appellate courts that they must
allow district courts to categorically disagree with the sentencing policy
underlying the crack cocaine Guideline, but it did not extend that holding to
all Guidelines. To the contrary, the Court cautioned that district court
disagreements with other Guidelines may be subject to ―closer review‖ by the
courts of appeals.
This language has resulted in differing approaches to other policy
disagreements in the circuits. Some have essentially ignored the closer review
dictum, while others have tried to determine which Guidelines are entitled to
closer review—and these efforts have created additional circuit splits. Still,
other appellate courts, clearly unwilling to deal with the uncertainty created
by Kimbrough, have decided to recharacterize district court sentencing
decisions as driven by case-specific factors so that they need not take a side in
the developing conflicts.
The confusion after Kimbrough is endemic in modern federal sentencing.
That the Court‘s opinion in a case that was designed to clarify appellate
review after Booker has resulted in more confusion and new circuit splits is
not only ironic, it also suggests that the Court‘s attempt to preserve the
Guidelines‘ centrality through appellate review may ultimately be doomed to
fail. This Article argues that there may be a better way to encourage district
courts to sentence within the Guidelines—namely, for the United States
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) to attempt to persuade district
courts that the policy decisions underlying the Guidelines and the resulting
sentencing ranges are appropriate. If a district court agrees with the substance
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, then it is likely to impose a Guidelines
sentence, even if it has the discretion not to do so. This approach avoids the
impossible task of satisfying contradictory goals, and it should result in a
more coherent law of sentencing.
seeks to preserve uniformity through appellate review, which by its nature is a limitation on district
courts.‖) (footnote omitted).
7. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (stating that ―sentencing appeals . . . would tend to iron out
sentencing differences‖).
8. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 18–28 (detailing how the Court‘s post-Booker cases
diverge from ordinary principles of appellate review).
9. See id. at 34–35 (noting inconsistent statements in the Court‘s post-Booker cases); Leading
Cases, supra note 4, at 333 (noting ―the contrast between [Kimbrough‘s] holding and its dicta‖).
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The Article proceeds in six parts. Part II describes the cases leading up to
the decision in Kimbrough. Part III critiques the Kimbrough decision. Part
IV explains how the federal appellate courts have read the Kimbrough opinion
in different ways, giving rise to the ensuing circuit splits. Part V offers a
solution to the Court‘s sentencing conundrum, namely that the Commission
ought to promote adherence to the Guidelines by persuading district courts
that the policies underlying the Guidelines are appropriate. Part VI concludes.
II. HOW THE COURT ARRIVED AT KIMBROUGH
Prior to 1984, federal sentencing was left almost entirely to the discretion
of district court judges. District court sentencing was restricted only by the
statutory maximum sentence and, for some offenses, a statutory minimum
sentence; appellate review was essentially unavailable. 10 The Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (the SRA11) drastically restricted the discretion of federal
sentencing judges. The SRA created a sentencing commission to develop
mandatory guidelines limiting available sentences in particular cases. 12 The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines assigned narrow sentencing ranges within the
broader statutory sentencing limits. These Guideline ranges were based on a
number of variables, including the offense of conviction, the circumstances
surrounding the offense, and the defendant‘s prior criminal convictions.
Judges were permitted to sentence outside the Guideline range only in the few
situations expressly permitted by the Guidelines, 13 or where the sentencing
judge found ―there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, [that was] not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described.‖ 14
The Supreme Court dramatically changed federal sentencing practice in a
series of cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, which
culminated in Booker. The first of these cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey,
involved a state statute that increased the maximum sentence for the unlawful
possession of a firearm from ten to twenty years imprisonment if the
sentencing judge found that the defendant possessed the firearm to intimidate

10. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
13. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (2008) (identifying appropriate and
inappropriate grounds for departure).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006); see also KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 101–03 (1998) (noting, prior to
Booker, that this provision severely hampered district court ability to depart from the Guidelines).
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someone because of his or her race.15 The Apprendi Court struck down the
statute, stating that, other than a prior conviction, ―any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖16 Four years after
Apprendi, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court held that mandatory sentencing
guidelines can violate the Sixth Amendment if a judge‘s sentencing discretion
is limited to a range narrower than the statutory range unless the sentencing
court makes particular factual findings. 17 The Blakely Court explained that
mandatory guidelines fall within the Apprendi rule because ―the ‗statutory
maximum‘ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.‖18
Less than a year after deciding Blakely, the Court in Booker held that the
mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because, in many
situations, they restricted federal judges‘ ability to sentence above the
Guideline ranges unless the judges engaged in judicial fact-finding. 19
Although the Supreme Court‘s previous Sixth Amendment sentencing cases
required the court to abandon mandatory sentencing guidelines based on
judicial fact-finding, a majority of the Court was unwilling to submit
sentencing facts to juries, because it would limit the ability to sentence based
on ―real conduct‖20—the manner in which different defendants commit the
same offense in different ways. If sentencing facts had to be found by a jury,
then parties would engage in plea bargaining for sentencing facts, which
would seriously decrease the influence of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.21 Thus, instead of requiring federal prosecutors to submit
sentencing enhancements to a jury,22 the Booker Court adopted an unexpected
remedy: The Court rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory by
severing the statutory provision making the Guidelines mandatory, and it
directed district courts to impose sentences based on a balance of various

15. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
16. Id. at 490.
17. 542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004).
18. Id. at 303.
19. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). For example, a court could
increase a defendant‘s sentence above a particular Guidelines range if it first made factual findings
regarding whether the defendant used a gun in the commission of the offense, see, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2008), or how much economic loss the defendant
caused, see, e.g., USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1).
20. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 250.
21. See id. at 256. The remedial Booker majority also expressed concerns about the practical
implementation of proving sentencing facts to juries. Id. at 254–55.
22. Four justices supported such a remedy. See id. at 272, 284–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part); id. at 313, 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).

2009]

POST-KIMBROUGH APPELLATE REVIEW

721

factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).23 The Booker Court also modified
the appellate standard of review for federal sentencing decisions. Before
Booker, appellate courts generally reviewed sentencing determinations
de novo. 24 Booker held, however, that sentencing decisions would be
reviewed for ―reasonableness.‖25 Reasonableness is an unusual standard of
appellate review, 26 and since Booker was decided in 2005, the Court has heard
three additional cases to clarify how appellate courts ought to review district
court sentencing decisions.
The first of these post-Booker cases, Rita v. United States, authorized
courts of appeals to review within-Guidelines sentences using a ―presumption
of reasonableness.‖27 The second case, Gall v. United States, rejected a rule
adopted by several courts of appeals that had required district courts to give
―‗proportional‘ justifications for departures from the Guidelines range.‖ 28 The
Gall Court clarified that ―[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is
inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.‖29
The third case in which the Court clarified the appropriate scope of
appellate review was Kimbrough v. United States.30 The issue in Kimbrough
was whether a district court may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines
range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Sentencing
Commission‘s treatment of crack cocaine. Federal criminal law‘s treatment
of crack cocaine has long been controversial, 31 as a defendant convicted for a
crack cocaine offense is, for sentencing purposes, treated the same as an
offender convicted for an offense involving 100 times more powder cocaine. 32
23. Id. at 245–46.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
25. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 (directing appellate courts to ―determine whether the sentence ‗is
unreasonable‘ with regard to § 3553(a)‖).
26. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 9–11, 14–16.
27. 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007).
28. 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 51.
30. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The Data Tell
Us that It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 87, 91 (2003) (advocating a
reassessment of the ―distressing and embarrassing 100:1 disparity in the sentencing guidelines for
crack compared to powder cocaine‖); William Jefferson Clinton, Op-Ed., Erasing America’s Color
Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2001, at WK17 (arguing for reducing the sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of
Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 155–56 (2003) (collecting ―street culture‖
criticisms of the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1298–1301 (1995) (arguing that the crack/powder cocaine
disparity should raise equal protection concerns); see generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE W AR ON DRUGS (2007).
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Several circuits had held that district courts were bound to apply the crack
Guideline, which incorporated this 100-to-1 ratio, unless there were casespecific circumstances warranting a non-Guidelines sentence. 33
The
Kimbrough Court held that district courts have the ability to sentence outside
of the Guidelines range based on a categorical disagreement with the
crack/powder cocaine disparity, suggesting that district courts are free to base
sentencing decisions on policy disagreements with the Guidelines as opposed
to case-specific factual circumstances.34
The government‘s brief in Kimbrough conceded ―that the Guidelines ‗are
now advisory‘ and that, as a general matter, ‗courts may vary [from
Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including
disagreements with the Guidelines.‘‖ 35 However, the government argued that
the crack/powder cocaine disparity was ―an exception to the ‗general freedom
that sentencing courts have‘ . . . because the ratio is ‗a specific policy
determinatio[n] that Congress has directed sentencing courts to observe.‘‖ 36
The 100-to-1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder cocaine derives from
Congress‘s 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which set different mandatory
minimum sentences for crack cocaine than powder cocaine. 37 The Kimbrough
Court ultimately rejected the government‘s argument that the crack/powder
cocaine disparity was mandated by congressional policy, stating, inter alia,
that Congress ―mandate[d] only maximum and minimum sentences . . . . The
statute says nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets, and
we decline to read any implicit directive into that congressional silence.‖ 38
Although the Kimbrough Court held that district courts are free to

33. See United States v. Leatch, 482 F.3d 790, 791 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States
v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62–63 (1st Cir.
2006); United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 361 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Eura, 440 F.3d
625, 633–34 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275–76 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 2006). But see United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d
1347, 1355–56 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court erred when it concluded that it had no
discretion to consider the crack/powder cocaine disparity in imposing a sentence); United States v.
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2006) (same).
34. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02; see also Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 844
(2009) (confirming that district courts may reject and categorically vary from the crack/powder
cocaine Guidelines even in a ―mine-run case where there are no ‗particular circumstances‘ that would
otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines‘ sentencing range‖) (citation omitted).
35. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101 (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473 (alteration in original)).
36. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, 25, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85
(2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473).
37. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). It imposed a five-year mandatory
minimum on any defendant accountable for five grams of crack or 500 grams of powder, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(h)(1)(B)(ii), (iii) (2006), and a ten-year mandatory minimum on any defendant accountable for
fifty grams of crack or 5,000 grams of powder, § 841(h)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).
38. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102–03.
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sentence outside the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the crack
cocaine Guideline, the opinion did not appear to adopt the government‘s
broad concession ―that as a general matter, ‗courts may vary [from Guidelines
ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with
the Guidelines.‘‖39 Instead, the Court appeared to place some limits on the
ability of district courts to sentence based on policy disagreements to cases
involving particular Guidelines. The Court intimated that district courts are
not constrained by the crack/powder cocaine sentencing ratio because the
crack cocaine ―Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of its
characteristic institutional role.‖40
The Court noted in ―formulating
Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses, . . . the Commission looked to
the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take
account of ‗empirical data and national experience.‘‖ 41 The Court indicated
that, ―in the ordinary case, the Commission‘s recommendation of a sentencing
range will ‗reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)‘s objectives.‘‖42 And, in such an ordinary case—that is, in a case
where the Guidelines in question do ―exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of
its characteristic institutional role‖43—―closer review may be in order‖ when a
district court bases its decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence on a
policy disagreement. 44 The Court reiterated this possibility of ―closer review‖
in a subsequent case, Spears v. United States, stating that a district court‘s
―‗inside the heartland‘ departure (which is necessarily based on a policy
disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily disagrees on a ‗categorical
basis‘) may be entitled to less respect.‖45
III. CRITICISMS OF THE KIMBROUGH OPINION
The Court‘s opinion in Kimbrough can be criticized on a number of
grounds: It contradicts a number of nonsentencing legal doctrines, and it has
led to confusion and conflict in the circuits, some of which is directly
attributable to the Court‘s reliance on a largely inaccurate picture of the
Guidelines as derived from empirical study. The Kimbrough opinion departs
from ordinary legal principles in two distinct ways. First, as I have argued
elsewhere, the decision in Kimbrough turns ordinary appellate practice on its

39. Id. at 101 (quoting Brief for the United States at 16, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85 (2007) (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473).
40. Id. at 109.
41. Id. at 109–10 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring)).
42. Id. at 109 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009) (per curiam).

724

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:717

head by requiring appellate courts to defer to district courts‘ policy
decisions.46 ―Policy decisions‖—as the term is used in Kimbrough—are legal
determinations, and are thus ordinarily subject to de novo review. 47 But
―de novo appellate review of substantive sentencing policy determinations
would functionally reinstate the mandatory system condemned in Booker
because it would inevitably result in binding legal rules defining sentencing
ranges.‖48 Deferential review largely avoids this problem, 49 but it does so by
sacrificing uniformity.
Second, the Court‘s analysis regarding which Guidelines are deserving of
―closer‖ appellate review also runs counter to ordinary principles of
administrative law, as it seems to suggest that district courts have a greater
obligation to defer to the policy determinations of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission than to the policy determinations of Congress. 50
The
crack/powder cocaine Guidelines were, according to the Kimbrough Court,
acceptably disregarded by district courts because
The Commission did not use [its ordinary] empirical
approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drugtrafficking offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act‘s
weight-driven scheme. The Guidelines use a drug quantity
table based on drug type and weight to set base offense
levels for drug trafficking offenses. In setting offense levels
for crack and powder cocaine, the Commission, in line with
the 1986 Act, adopted the 100-to-1 ratio.51

46. See generally Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6.
47. Id. at 26–27.
48. Id. at 30; see also id. at 30 n.149.
49. Cf. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
(stating that a judicial holding that one interpretation is reasonable does not bar an agency from
adopting a different, reasonable interpretation).
50. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1491–92 (2008).
Most curiously, the opinion suggests that implementing the will of Congress is
the exception for the Commission, and that where the Commission is merely
responding to the requests or mandates of Congress, sentencing judges have
freedom to disagree with the policy judgments embedded in the Guidelines.
Where, on the other hand, the Guidelines represent ―empirical analysis,‖ judges
are generally not free to disagree with the policy judgments they embody . . . .
Of course, reflecting the will of Congress is ordinarily a basis for judicial
deference to administrative regulations.
Id.
51. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–97 (2007) (citation omitted).
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The Kimbrough Court also noted that, based on ―additional research and
experience with the 100-to-1 ratio,‖ the Commission later concluded that the
crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity ―fails to meet the sentencing
objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and the
1986 Act.‖52
The Commission has, on more than one occasion,
communicated its new conclusions about the crack/powder cocaine sentencing
disparity to Congress and suggested that Congress ought to revisit the
100-to-1 ratio reflected in statutory minimum sentences. 53 Congress has, to
date, not acted on those findings or the Commission‘s suggestion.
The Kimbrough Court‘s decision to permit district courts to deviate from
Guidelines that the Commission itself now disavows makes some sense.
After all, the Commission is an expert agency, and thus its conclusions
regarding crack and powder cocaine should carry some weight.54 However,
the Commission is not the only governmental body that has expressed an
opinion of the appropriate sentencing policy. Congress‘s determination that a
100-to-1 ratio is appropriate is reflected in its 1986 drug legislation, and that
determination formed the basis for the original crack cocaine sentencing
Guidelines. But the Court essentially accorded this congressional policy
decision no weight. In saying that district courts are free to disagree with the
crack/powder cocaine disparities in the Guidelines because they are the
product of a Commission effort to effectuate a congressional policy choice, as
opposed to the Commission‘s ordinary empirical process, Kimbrough is
inconsistent with administrative law principles. The principle underlying one
of the stronger forms of judicial deference to administrative action—Chevron
deference—is based, in part, on the idea that the agency is acting in accord
with Congress‘s wishes.55
Aside from disregarding ordinary legal principles, Kimbrough has led to

52. Id. at 97 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM ‘N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING P OLICY 91 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/
2002crackrpt.pdf [hereinafter COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING P OLICY].
53. See, e.g., COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 52, at 93; U.S.
Sentencing Comm‘n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (Apr.
1997), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT‘G REP. 184 (1998).
54. Cf. United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436, 450 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (discussing district court authority to depart from the crack Guideline after the
Commission issued a report critical of the crack/powder cocaine disparity; noting that ―surely the
Commission as a data collection body must have significant expertise concerning the impact of its
own guidelines‖ and that ―if this were a run-of-the-mill administrative law case, I predict that we
would not hesitate for a moment to vacate an agency‘s legislative rule, if the agency itself admitted
that the rule was arbitrary, capricious, unfair, and violative of a federal statute, and then documented
that admission with credible evidence‖).
55. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also
Stith, supra note 50, at 1492 (―[R]eflecting the will of Congress is ordinarily a basis for judicial
deference to administrative regulations.‖).
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confusion and conflict in the circuits. One specific feature of Kimbrough that
is causing circuit confusion and conflict is the Court‘s analysis regarding
which Guidelines are deserving of ―closer‖ appellate review. The Court‘s
dictum on this issue is based on the premise that most Guidelines are the
product of Commission expertise.
Kimbrough notes that ―Congress
established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine national
sentencing standards [and that] the Commission fills an important institutional
role [because it] has the capacity courts lack to base its determinations on
empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with
appropriate expertise.‖56
But this description of the Sentencing Commission‘s institutional
strengths and the process by which the Guidelines were written is not entirely
accurate. For one thing, the empirical process that the Court repeatedly
praises57 is methodologically suspect. For another, a great number of
Guidelines were not based on the empirical process. Kimbrough‘s failure to
accurately describe how the Guidelines were developed and amended may
lead to circuit court confusion and conflict because identifying which
Guideline deviations are subject to closer review will require litigants and
courts to dissect the origin and amendments of each Guideline. Kimbrough
suggests that courts must attempt to determine whether the present Guideline
is sufficiently derived from ―‗empirical data and national experience.‘‖58 If a
court believes that a Guideline is based on suspect methodology or has either
promulgated or subsequently amended a Guideline in a fashion that deviates
from ―empirical data and national experience‖—whatever that might mean—
then it must decide whether that Guideline is entitled to closer review. 59 And
that is a question likely to be answered differently by different judges. 60
Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer served as
one of the original U.S. Sentencing Commissioners and is often referred to as
the principal author of the original Guidelines. 61 Soon after the Guidelines
were originally promulgated, then-Judge Breyer published a law review
article in which he described the process by which the Guidelines were
created:
56. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108–09 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
57. Kimbrough, like the opinion in Booker and its other progeny, contains laudatory language
about the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 109–10; see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348–49
(2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
252–56, 264–65 (2005).
58. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)).
59. See id.
60. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 331 (noting that ―Kimbrough left judges with little
guidance on how to incorporate or review policy disagreements and related factors‖).
61. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 58.

2009]

POST-KIMBROUGH APPELLATE REVIEW

727

Faced, on the one hand, with those who advocated ―just
deserts‖ but could not produce a convincing, objective way
to rank criminal behavior in detail, and, on the other hand,
with those who advocated ―deterrence‖ but had no
convincing empirical data linking detailed and small
variations in punishment to prevention of crime, the
Commission reached an important compromise. It decided
to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average,
actual past practice. 62
The Commission had access to the sentences imposed for tens of
thousands of cases, and it used the average sentences imposed as a ―numerical
anchor for guideline development.‖63 But while the Commission‘s process
could accurately capture the length of sentences that judges imposed, it was
poorly designed to identify the sentencing factors that influenced past
sentencing practice. 64 As Kate Stith has noted, ―there were no available data
in most presentence reports with respect to many of the factors that the
Sentencing Commission decided were most relevant to a sentence; nor did the
Commission seek to determine what factors the sentencing judges in the
sample of 10,000 cases actually considered in imposing sentence.‖ 65 That this
empirical process did not accurately determine the ―past practice‖ of judges
62. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988).
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM‘N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND P OLICY STATEMENTS 22 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]; see also
Breyer, supra note 62, at 17 (―The numbers used and the punishments imposed would come fairly
close to replicating the average pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of
criminals.‖); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 125 (2003)
(―The [C]ommission used the average sentences (conditioned on the percentage of persons actually
sentenced to prison) as the basis for their final deliberations.‖).
64. The Commission used data from past cases to try to isolate variables that played a role in
increasing or decreasing an offender‘s sentence, but as then-Judge Breyer noted, the Commission
faced ―uncertainty as to how a sentencing judge would actually account for the aggravating and/or
mitigating factors . . . .‖ Breyer, supra note 62, at 19. To the extent the Commission tried to use past
sentencing practice to identify sentencing factors, then-Judge Breyer described the following process:
―The Commission was able to determine which past factors were important in pre-Guideline
sentencing by asking probation officers to analyze 10,500 actual past cases in detail . . . .‖ Id. at 18.
But it was judges not probation officers who ultimately decided what sentence to impose and what
sentencing factors to consider in selecting that sentence prior to the Guidelines. Id.
65. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Improving the
Guidelines Through Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role for District Courts, 57 DRAKE L.
REV. 575, 578 (2009) (citing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 61) (noting that ―when the
Commission drafted the original Guidelines it had limited data concerning past practice, and the data
it did have was sketchy‖).
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regarding which facts were relevant in sentencing almost certainly is reflected
in the Guidelines: The Guidelines contained far more aggravating than
mitigating factors,66 and they largely failed to account for an offender‘s
background, other than her criminal history, which seems inconsistent with
pre-Guideline sentencing practice. 67
The process that the Commission used to determine past practice has been
the subject of repeated methodological criticism. Bernard Harcourt, for
example, has noted that the Commission ―did not create a statistical model to
replicate judicial decision making, but instead used a basic averaging
approach to estimate existing sentencing practices along certain variables.‖ 68
Harcourt has also stated that the Commission‘s ―actual methodology is
somewhat mysterious; the methodological appendix to the sentencing
guidelines does not meet social science standards and seems almost
deliberately intended to obfuscate discussion of the methods used.‖ 69 Kate
Stith and José Cabranes have noted that ―the Commission diminished the
advantages of relying on past sentencing practices by failing to do so in any
systematic way.‖70 They also note that ―the Commission‘s data analysis was
limited, and possibly compromised, in several fundamental respects. The
Commission conceded that for several categories of offenses it simply did not
have sufficient data to ascertain average past practice.‖71 And because ―the
Commission arbitrarily excluded sentences of probation, [it] significantly
skewed the data relating to past practice because approximately 50% of
defendants in the preguideline era received sentences of probation.‖72
Whatever the merit of the Commission‘s empirical process, it is
indisputable that the Commission elected to deviate from past practice in a

66. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1128 (2008); Michele A. Kalstein et al., Calculating Injustice: The Fixation on
Punishment As Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 605 (1992).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels 446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that
sentencing courts have a duty to consider ―all of the circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime and the past life and habits of the [defendant]‖); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note
14, at 79–80 (commenting that, prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, ―the largest section of the
presentence report‖—which was an important document for a judge‘s sentencing deliberations—
―dealt with the personal history and circumstances of the defendant‖); Kalstein et al., supra note 66,
at 604 (―In direct contrast to sentencing practices [prior to the SRA], the Guidelines effectively
forbid the court to consider the personal characteristics of the defendant (except for criminal history)
and focus instead on the offense and the defendant‘s role in the offense.‖).
68. Harcourt, supra note 63, at 123.
69. Id. Harcourt also identifies a ―number of inconsistencies‖ in the report the Commission
issued explaining the initial Guidelines. Id. at 123 n.122 (discussing SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,
supra note 63).
70. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 60.
71. Id. at 61.
72. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578.
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significant number of areas.73 As a general matter, the Commission elected to
limit the number of factual distinctions between offenders (i.e., the number of
sentencing factors). Reasoning that ―the more facts the court must find . . . ,
the more unwieldy the [sentencing] process becomes,‖ 74 the Commission
self-consciously forbade courts from considering factors that previously
played a role in sentencing decisions. Individual characteristics of a
defendant—factors that traditionally played a largely mitigating role—―were
determined to be either not relevant or not ordinarily relevant‖ to sentencing
decisions.75 The Commission not only deviated from past practice with
respect to sentencing factors, but also with respect to sentence lengths. In
formulating the initial Guidelines, ―the Commission provided for significant
increases in sentences for major categories of crime . . . .‖76 Indeed, as other
commentators have noted, the ―categories of offenses, for which the
Commission conceded it purposely deviated from past practice . . . actually
far outnumber the remaining categories of cases.‖77
Since they were originally promulgated, the Guidelines have drifted
further away from their original empirical basis. There have been ―hundreds
of amendments to the original Guidelines, most of which increase penalties at
the express direction of Congress.‖78 The Supreme Court did not appear to
take note of this trend in its recent sentencing opinions. Discussing Justice
Breyer‘s description of the Guidelines in Rita, Paul Hofer has said: ―Absent
from his description of the Commission‘s work is any discussion of the role
played by mandatory minimum penalty statutes, specific directives from
Congress to the Sentencing Commission to increase penalties or set them at
particular levels, or the many other ways that Congress has shaped the present
Guidelines.‖79
The Kimbrough Court‘s simplistic description of the Guidelines‘
promulgation being an ―empirical process‖ 80 and their subsequent

73. E.g., United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting sources
indicating that the Guidelines did not, in fact, accurately represent past sentencing practice).
74. Breyer, supra note 62, at 11.
75. Harcourt, supra note 63, at 126.
76. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578 (noting
that ―the Commission, without serious explanation, increased the severity of sentences for a number
of offenses‖).
77. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 60–61.
78. Stith, supra note 50, at 1491; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578 (noting
that ―since enacting the original Guidelines, the Commission has amended many of them, making
them even more severe‖).
79. Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 DENV. U. L.
REV. 27, 47 (2007).
80. The Court‘s decision in Gall, decided the same day as Kimbrough, included the following
remark:
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amendments being based on ―national experience‖ is misleading. 81 This
inaccuracy is problematic because the Court has suggested that the level of
appellate scrutiny for non-Guidelines sentences that are based on policy
disagreement may turn on whether a particular Guideline was derived from
―empirical data and national experience.‖ 82 In determining whether Guideline
deviations are subject to closer review, courts of appeals attempt to identify
the origin and amendments of each Guideline and determine whether the
present Guideline is sufficiently derived from empirical data and national
experience. 83 But because the Kimbrough Court did not acknowledge ―the
many other ways that Congress has shaped the present Guidelines,‖84 courts
have reached different conclusions about the same Guidelines. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit undertook an analysis of the child pornography Guideline
§ 2G2.2, concluding that this Guideline
[does] not exhibit the deficiencies the Supreme Court
identified in Kimbrough. First, the Guidelines range is
derived at least in part from the early Parole Guidelines,
rather than directly derived from Congressional mandate. . . .
Second, there is no indication that either the Guidelines
range or the policy statement . . . suffers from any criticisms
like those Kimbrough identified for the crack cocaine
Guidelines. There, the Supreme Court found that the
Sentencing Commission itself had ―reported that the
crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh

Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence. For
example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach
when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key
the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress
established for such crimes. This decision, and its effect on a district judge‘s
authority to deviate from the Guidelines range in a particular drug case, is
addressed in Kimbrough v. United States.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–47 n.2 (2007) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1A1.1 (2006); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)).
81. As Judge Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich have recently explained, ―few guidelines can be
shown to be based on actual preguideline sentencing practice or on Commission research and
expertise,‖ and many of the subsequent Guideline amendments ―came in response to Congress‘s
actions—either its establishment of mandatory minimums or its directives to the Commission.‖
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578–79.
82. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring)).
83. This may be difficult because ―[t]he only account of the Commission‘s so-called
past-practice study, the Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy
Statements, is unlikely to contain evidence that a particular guideline reflects past practice.‖
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 580.
84. Hofer, supra note 79, at 47.
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sanctions.‖ Here, the Sentencing Commission has not made
any similar statements; rather, the Guidelines and policy
statement are based in part upon Congress‘s longstanding
concern for recidivism in such cases . . . .85
Notably, several courts disagree with this closer review analysis of the
child pornography Guideline. 86 The Seventh Circuit has stated that
the child-pornography sentencing guidelines, like the drug
guidelines at issue in Kimbrough v. United States, are
atypical in that they were not based on the Sentencing
Commission‘s nationwide empirical study of criminal
sentencing. . . . ―[M]uch like policymaking in the area of
drug trafficking, Congress has used a mix of mandatory
minimum penalty increases and directives to the
Commission to change sentencing policy for sex offenses.‖ 87
A number of district courts have concluded ―that the child-pornography
guidelines‘ lack of empirical support provides sentencing judges the
discretion to sentence below those guidelines based on policy disagreements
with them.‖88
The child pornography Guideline is far from the only Guideline whose
present ranges are not solely a reflection of ―past practice or any of the
laudatory guideline amendment processes envisioned in the Sentencing
Reform Act, but instead the will of Congress expressed through the medium
of the sentencing Guidelines.‖89 Thus, it is quite possible that the circuits will
continue to disagree about which Guidelines are entitled to closer review in
the event of district court policy disagreement. Indeed, the circuits

85. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
86. Assistant Federal Public Defender Troy Stabenow has written a paper detailing how these
guidelines, like the crack/powder cocaine guidelines, were based largely on congressional directives
rather than empirical study. Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on
the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines (July 3, 2008) (unpublished paper),
available at http://mow.fd.org/3%20July%202008%20Edit.pdf.
87. United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM ‘N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS
OF
SENTENCING
REFORM
x
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/
15_year_study_full.pdf).
88. Id. at 697 (collecting cases).
89. Hofer, supra note 79, at 47–48; see also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 579 (―Many
of the Commission‘s amendments increasing the severity of sentences came in response to
Congress‘s actions—either its establishment of mandatory minimums or its directives to the
Commission. Such amendments obviously are not based on Commission research and expertise.‖)
(footnote omitted).
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themselves have commented about the lingering state of appellate uncertainty
after Kimbrough.90 Perhaps in an attempt to avoid this uncertainty, several
courts have recast what appear to be district courts‘ policy disagreements with
the Guidelines as case-specific reasons for imposing a non-Guidelines
sentence. 91 Such a recasting permits courts to review district court decisions
under the more simple abuse-of-discretion standard articulated in Gall, 92
rather than forcing appellate courts to grapple with the closer review language
in Kimbrough. Indeed, one opinion noted that, because ―the District Court did
not vary from the Guidelines range ‗solely‘ based on a disagreement with its
ability to properly reflect § 3553(a) considerations,‖ the court did not need to
―elaborate further on what the ‗closer review‘ and ‗less respect‘ mentioned in
Kimbrough . . . might entail.‖93 Another court was even more direct, stating:
Given our conclusion that the sentence imposed by the
district court is not based on a simple disagreement with the
policies underlying [the Guideline], as opposed to something
about [the defendant‘s] personal characteristics or history,
this court need not delve into a difficult antecedent question:
how this court should review district court sentences based
simply on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. 94
Until the Court adopts a more realistic view of the Guidelines‘
promulgation and amendments—and until it explains how its Kimbrough
dictum about closer review ought to function under this more realistic view—
90. See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (―The Court has been
equivocal about whether a sentencing court owes greater deference to guidelines that do exemplify
this ‗characteristic institutional role,‘ and whether closer appellate review is warranted with respect
to variances from such guidelines.‖); United States v. Mikowski, No. 08-1791, 2009 WL 1546375, at
*5 n.9 (6th Cir. June 3, 2009) (quoting United States v. Grossman, 515 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir.
2008)) (noting that ―[t]he extent to which a district court may offer a wholesale disagreement with a
guideline as the basis for a variance remains unclear after Kimbrough‖); United States v. Evans, 526
F.3d 155, 168 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring) (―While I have closely studied the postBooker Supreme Court triumvirate of Rita, Kimbrough v. United States, and Gall, I must conclude
that the Court has left the specifics of how appellate courts are to conduct substantive reasonableness
review, charitably speaking, unclear. Inevitably, as is the nature of appellate courts, vacuums of
legal uncertainty left by the Supreme Court are quickly filled in a circuit by circuit manner,
sometimes resulting in a grab bag of possible solutions.‖) (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Gil-Hernandez, 309 F. App‘x 566, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing whether Kimbrough has an
impact on fast-track sentencing disparities as a ―complicated‖ question).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 284 F. App‘x 719, 721–22 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569–70
(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that a non-Guidelines sentence imposed because of ―the special conditions of
a particular offender‖ is not subject to ―closer review‖ and then concluding that the district court‘s
sentence was ―based on the particular circumstances of this defendant‖).
92. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
93. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 570, 571 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
94. United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009).
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confusion and disagreements are likely to persist.
IV. WHAT APPELLATE COURTS HAVE DONE AFTER KIMBROUGH
In light of the ambiguous language contained in the Kimbrough decision
and the criticism that can be leveled at the opinion, it may come as no surprise
that the circuits have taken several different approaches to reviewing district
court policy determinations after Kimbrough. Indeed, the Court has already
decided an additional case in order to clarify some ambiguous dicta from
Kimbrough that led several circuits to permit district courts to vary from the
crack cocaine Guidelines based only on individual case or defendant
characteristics, rather than based on categorical policy disagreements. 95
Spears v. United States confirmed that ―district courts are entitled to reject
and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with those Guidelines,‖ as opposed to case-specific criteria. 96
But several other points of contention remain, including whether to follow the
closer review dictum, what effect Kimbrough had on prior circuit precedent,
and whether certain Guidelines represent policy choices by the Commission
or by Congress. The circuits disagree on each of these questions.
The circuits have taken divergent approaches on the question of whether
district court policy disagreement with certain Guidelines—those that were
the product of empirical data and national experience97—ought to be subject
to closer review. 98 The Second Circuit, skeptical of these dicta in Kimbrough,
noted that it does not ―take the Supreme Court‘s comments concerning the
scope and nature of ‗closer review‘ to be the last word on these questions‖ 99
and that the reference to closer review
cannot be construed as a signal to view non-Guidelines
sentences with inherent suspicion or to establish a higher
standard of review than abuse of discretion for some nonGuidelines sentences.
While an appellate court may
certainly consider the extent of a Guidelines variance as well
as any policy concerns informing it in reviewing the totality
of circumstances bearing on the reasonableness of a

95. The following language from Kimbrough appears to have misled post-Kimbrough courts:
―[T]he [district] court did not purport to establish a ratio of its own. Rather, it appropriately framed
its final determination in line with § 3553(a)‘s overarching instruction to ‗impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary‘ to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in
§ 3553(a)(2).‖ Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
96. Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843–44 (2009).
97. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2008).
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challenged sentence, what it may not do is review the district
court‘s fact finding for anything other than clear error.100
The Fourth Circuit has similarly noted that, although the Kimbrough
opinion indicates that ―closer review may be in order,‖ if a district court
disagrees with Guidelines policy in a ―‗mine-run case,‘. . . regardless of
whether the district court has agreed or disagreed with the Commission, we
may only review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.‖ 101 And the
Fifth Circuit has, at least in one opinion, read Kimbrough expansively, stating
that a district court may disagree with all Guidelines policy decisions because
―Kimbrough does not limit the relevance of a district court‘s policy
disagreement with the Guidelines to the situations such as the cocaine
disparity and whatever might be considered similar.‖102
Not all circuits have been so dismissive of the Kimbrough dicta. Others
have analyzed the process by which a Guideline was developed when
reviewing district court policy decisions. For example, the First Circuit
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine whether the fast-track departure
Guideline is similar to the crack/powder cocaine disparity. The court
reasoned that, like the crack/powder cocaine disparity, ―fast-track departure
authority has been both blessed by Congress and openly criticized by the
Sentencing Commission‖ and that ―the fast-track departure scheme does not
‗exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic
institutional role.‘‖103 These similarities led the First Circuit to conclude that
a non-Guidelines sentence ―premised on perceived inequities attributable to
the availability elsewhere of fast-track departures would, given the Supreme
Court‘s new gloss, seem to be entitled to deference ‗even in a mine-run
case.‘‖104 And, as discussed in more detail above, several courts have
analyzed whether the child pornography Guideline is the product of empirical

100. United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit has even
pointed (in dicta) to other Guidelines, which if the subject of district court policy disagreement,
―should be reviewed especially deferentially.‖ Cavera, 550 F.3d at 192. The Cavera Court
specifically identified those ―Guidelines enhancements and reductions [which] apply without
modulation to a wide range of conduct,‖ including the Armed Career Criminal Guidelines and those
financial Guidelines that ―drastically vary as to the recommended sentence based simply on the
amount of money involved.‖ Id. This suggests an entirely different standard for deferential appellate
review than whether a Guideline was the product of empirical data and national experience.
101. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 165 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kimbrough, 552
U.S. at 109; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
102. United States v. Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kimbrough, 552
U.S. at 101). The court went on to note the closer review language and observe that this language
―might require further case development.‖ Id.
103. United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Kimbrough, 552
U.S. at 109) (alterations in original).
104. Id. (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109–10).
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data and national experience.105
In the wake of Kimbrough, circuit court judges have disagreed whether
Kimbrough‘s recognition that district courts may sentence outside the
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement extends beyond the crack/powder
cocaine disparity to other Guidelines. 106
The district court policy
disagreements discussed include the career offender Guideline, 107 the fasttrack Guideline, 108 the terrorism Guideline, 109 the child pornography and
exploitation Guidelines, 110 local community characteristics,111 and acquitted
conduct. 112
105. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
106. Compare United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (―Neither Kimbrough nor Spears authorized district courts to
categorically reject the policy judgments of the Sentencing Commission in areas outside of crackcocaine offenses, as the majority suggests. Kimbrough instead expressly reserved the question as to
whether a district court could categorically vary from the Guideline range based solely upon a policy
disagreement with the Commission in an area other than the crack-cocaine disparity . . . . The
Supreme Court only hinted that if a district court could categorically depart from the Guidelines
range in an area where the Commission has exercised its ‗characteristic institutional role,‘ closer
scrutiny of such a variance may be required. Kimbrough has thus not ‗made it clear‘ that district
courts may vary from the Guidelines based solely upon any policy disagreement.‖) (citations
omitted), with United States v. Lente, 323 F. App‘x 698, 712–13 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holmes, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (―Although Kimbrough arose in the crack-powder cocaine context, we
have not questioned that its holding concerning policy disagreements extends beyond that context.‖).
And some courts have noted the question, but not decided the issue. E.g., United States v. Johnson,
553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[W]e express no opinion on whether the principles articulated in
[Kimbrough and] Spears may apply outside of the crack-cocaine context to allow district courts to
develop categorical alternatives to other sentencing enhancements contained in the Guidelines that
‗do not exemplify the Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.‘‖) (quoting
Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009)).
107. E.g., United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2008) (indicating that
policy disagreement was permitted).
108. E.g., Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 227 (permitting policy disagreement); United States v.
Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (prohibiting district court disagreement).
109. E.g., United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing
only whether the district court disagreed with the Commission on congressional policy; not
addressing the closer review issue).
110. E.g., United States v. Huffstatler, 561 F.3d 694, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2009). As the
Huffstatler Court noted, a number of district courts have concluded ―that the child-pornography
guidelines‘ lack of empirical support provides sentencing judges the discretion to sentence below
those guidelines based on policy disagreements with them.‖ Id. at 697 (citing cases). It appears that
the government has appealed at least one of these decisions. United States v. Grober, 595
F. Supp. 2d 384, 412 (D.N.J. 2008) (sentencing defendant to sixty months imprisonment, well below
the Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months), appeal docketed, No. 09-2120 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2009).
111. E.g., United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2008) (appears to have been
decided on case-specific grounds, but recast in Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 230, as permitting policy
disagreement); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 201 (2d Cir. 2008).
112. E.g., United States v. Ibanga, 271 F. App‘x 298, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2008) (categorizing as
―procedural error‖ a district court‘s categorical exclusion of acquitted conduct from its sentencing
decision, despite the district court‘s stated reasoning ―that sentencing based upon acquitted conduct
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The differing treatment for the various policy disagreements appears to
depend not only on whether the circuit employs the closer review
contemplated in Kimbrough, but also two other issues. The first is how a
circuit analyzes Kimbrough‘s effect on previous circuit precedent. Some of
the post-Kimbrough circuit splits appear to be attributable to how the circuits
treat intervening Supreme Court cases that undermine the reasoning of prior
opinions from their own circuit. Some circuits have concluded that the
reasoning in Kimbrough abrogates prior circuit opinions that forbade district
courts from disagreeing with particular Guidelines. The First Circuit, for
example, has taken a relatively broad view of Kimbrough‘s effect on its prior
decisions, on the theory that, even if Kimbrough did not directly overrule prior
precedent, it ―offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in
light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind.‖ 113 Other
circuits, such as the Ninth114 and the Eleventh, 115 have construed Kimbrough‘s
effect on prior opinions more narrowly.
would not promote respect for the law as it would thwart the historic roles of the jury as finder of
fact, protector against government overreaching, and arbiter of guilt or innocence‖); United States v.
Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (―[E]ven though district judges are not required to
discount acquitted conduct, the Booker–Rita–Kimbrough–Gall line of cases may allow district judges
to discount acquitted conduct in particular cases—that is, to vary downward from the advisory
Guidelines range when the district judges do not find the use of acquitted conduct appropriate.‖).
113. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 225. In one instance, the First Circuit elected to rehear en banc a
case that questioned whether a non-residential burglary ought to be classified as a ―crime of
violence‖ under the Career Offender Sentencing Guideline. United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d
27 (1st Cir. 2008). Noting that ―there is no sign that the Sentencing Commission will resolve the
ambiguity about its intentions in the Career Offender Guideline; an ambiguity has now existed for
nearly twenty years,‖ the en banc court elected to overrule its previous case. Id. at 29. Interestingly,
after agreeing to hear the case en banc, but before overruling the previous panel decision, the First
Circuit indicated that the district court was free to sentence below the Guidelines range based on a
policy disagreement with the Guideline as interpreted by the circuit’s prior precedent. Id.; see
United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2008) (―[W]e do not see why disagreement
with the Commission‘s policy judgment (as expressed in the guideline as we interpreted it in Fiore)
would be any less permissible a reason to deviate than disagreement with the guideline policy
judgment at issue in Kimbrough.‖).
114. E.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Kimbrough
did not ‗effectively overrule[]‘ or ‗undercut[] the reasoning‘ of Marcial-Santiago so that the two
cases are ‗clearly irreconcilable.‘‖) (alterations in original).
115. E.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Under the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent
―unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.‖
. . . Kimbrough did not overrule Castro or its progeny, and so we are bound to
apply the prior precedent rule in this appeal. Specifically, Kimbrough never
discussed Castro or the cases following it, or otherwise commented on noncrack cocaine disparities, and so Kimbrough did not expressly overrule Castro
or its progeny. . . . [T]he most that can be said of Vega-Castillo‘s argument is
that it pits ―reasoning against holding,‖ but not ―holding against holding.‖
Id. at 1236, 1238–39 (internal citations omitted).
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These differing approaches to the effect of Kimbrough on circuit
precedent are especially important in those circuits that essentially did not
permit district court policy disagreements prior to Kimbrough. By refusing to
revisit those decisions after Kimbrough, courts can essentially limit the effect
of Kimbrough to the crack/powder cocaine Guidelines—or at least refuse to
revisit any Guidelines litigated prior to Kimbrough.
The second issue resulting in circuit conflict over specific Guidelines is
whether a particular Guideline represents a policy choice by Congress or by
the Commission. This conflict has played out largely in the context of the
career offender Guideline116 and the fast-track Guideline. 117 The Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that the sentencing disparities resulting
from fast-track departures were a result of congressional rather than
Commission policy, and thus a district court may not reduce a defendant‘s
sentence based on a policy disagreement with the fast-track disparities. 118
These courts have contended that fast-track disparities are congressional
policy because
Congress explicitly authorized downward sentencing
departures for fast-track programs in the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (―PROTECT Act‖). The PROTECT Act
directed the Sentencing Commission to ‗promulgate . . . a
policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not
more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such
departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized

116. Compare United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 882–85 (7th Cir. 2008) (recognizing
district court authority to disagree with the policy behind U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.1 (2006) and noting that ―section 994(h) only addresses what the Sentencing Commission
must do; it doesn‘t require sentencing courts to impose sentences ‗at or near‘ the statutory
maximums‖) and United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 663 (2d Cir. 2008) (similar), with United
States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1311 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009) (―In contrast to the crack Guidelines,
which were not adopted at the express direction of Congress, Congress did explicitly direct the
Sentencing Commission to incorporate into the Guidelines, for career offenders convicted of violent
crimes, sentencing ranges that are ‗at or near the maximum term authorized.‘‖) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h) (2006)) (internal citation omitted).
117. Compare United States v. Seval, 293 F. App‘x 834 (2d Cir. 2008), and Rodriguez, 527
F.3d at 230 (finding that a variance was appropriate after Kimbrough ―absent an unambiguous
congressional directive barring sentencing courts from considering [the] disparity‖), with VegaCastillo, 540 F.3d at 1238–39, and United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 562–63 (5th Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 624 (2008) (holding that Kimbrough is not controlling on the issue of
fast-track disparity because it ―addressed only a district court‘s discretion to vary from the Guidelines
based on disagreement with Guideline, not Congressional, policy‖). See generally Alison Siegler,
Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT‘G REP. 299, 300 (2009) (noting
the circuit split on this issue).
118. See Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 737–41; Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1239; GomezHerrera, 523 F.3d at 563.

738

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:717

by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.‘119
In contrast, the First Circuit has concluded that fast-track disparity is not
an ―express congressional directive‖ and thus, under the reasoning of
Kimbrough—which rejected the government‘s argument that district courts
could not deviate from the crack Guideline ―despite Congress‘s implicit
acquiescence in, or even its endorsement of, the 100-to-1 crack/powder
ratio‖—a district court is permitted to disagree with the Guideline on policy
grounds.120 The Third Circuit has recently joined the First Circuit on this side
of the split.121
Circuits have also taken differing approaches with respect to the career
offender Guideline, with some insisting that the Guideline reflects
congressional policy—that is, Congress ―explicitly directed‖ the
Commission‘s punishment of career offenders 122—and others rejecting the
view. 123 This split appears to have been fueled by dicta in Kimbrough
suggesting that the career offender Guideline may be appropriately
characterized as congressional policy. 124 Complicating the issue is that the
government originally appears to have taken inconsistent positions on this
question in different circuits125 and, more recently, the United States has
119. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 739 (internal citations omitted).
120. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 229–30.
121. United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, No. 08-4397, 2009 WL 2914495 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,
2009).
122. E.g., United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1135 (2010). The Seventh Circuit appears to have initially permitted district court disagreement with
the career offender Guideline in United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 882–85 (7th Cir. 2008), then
prohibited it in United States v. Welton, No. 08-3799, 2009 WL 3151162, at *4 (7th Cir. Oct. 2,
2009) (―disavow[ing] that portion of‖ Liddell that ―did not adequately recognize that the career
offender crack/powder disparity is the result of a legislative act‖), and finally permitted it again in
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
123. E.g., United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008).
124. In rejecting the government‘s argument that the crack/powder disparity reflected a
congressional policy, the Kimbrough Court noted that ―[d]rawing meaning from silence is
particularly inappropriate here, for Congress has shown that it knows how to dir ect sentencing
practices in express terms. For example, Congress has specifically required the Sentencing
Commission to set Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist offenders ‗at or near‘ the statutory
maximum.‖ Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)–(i)
(2006)). The Court‘s distinction between the career offender Guideline and the crack/powder
cocaine Guidelines might signal that the career offender Guideline is mandated by Congress and
thus, like a statutory minimum sentence, may not be ignored by a sentencing court. On the other
hand, the congressional directive was aimed at the Commission, rather than district courts, so there is
some meaningful way to distinguish between this Guideline and statutory sentencing ranges.
125. See Liddell, 543 F.3d at 884 (noting that the First Circuit rejected the government‘s
argument, ―based on section 994(h), that the district court erred by awarding a below-guideline
sentence to a crack career offender‖ and that the government submitted a brief before the Seventh
Circuit ―emphasiz[ing] that a district court can sentence below the career offender guidelines if the
court disagrees with the policy underlying the crack/powder disparity‖).
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confessed error in cases where appellate courts have stated that district courts
have no authority to sentence outside the career offender Guideline based on a
policy disagreement. 126
One final post-Kimbrough circuit court development worth noting
involves the presumption of reasonableness. A number of defendants have
argued that their within-Guidelines sentences ought not to be reviewed on
appeal under the presumption of reasonableness because the Guidelines used
to calculate their sentences were not a product of empirical data and national
experience. The opinion in Rita permitted appellate courts to employ a
presumption of reasonableness, noting the presumption ―simply recognizes
the real-world circumstance that when the [sentencing] judge‘s discretionary
decision accords with the Commission‘s view of the appropriate application
of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is
reasonable.‖127 This holding in Rita was predicated on the Court‘s
observation that the Commission‘s recommendation of a sentencing range
will ordinarily ―reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§ 3553(a)‘s objectives.‖128 But Kimbrough acknowledged that not all
Guidelines necessarily reflect such an approximation. Indeed, the Kimbrough
Court noted that ―the Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder
disparity produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack
cocaine offenses ‗greater than necessary‘ in light of the purposes of
sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).‖129 Seizing on this language from
Kimbrough, several defendants note that if a Guideline does not reflect a
rough approximation of the § 3553(a) sentencing goals—that is, if a Guideline
―was not promulgated according to usual Sentencing Commission procedures
and did not take into account ‗empirical data and national experience‘‖ 130—
then the analysis offered in support of the presumption in Rita is no longer
applicable and the presumption of reasonableness ought not apply.
The two circuits that have addressed this argument have rejected it. The
Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected this argument,131 and the Tenth Circuit
recently rejected it as well. 132 (It does not appear that the other circuits have
126. See Corner, 598 F.3d at 414 (noting that the ―United States has confessed error and asked
us to overrule Welton‖ and that before the ―Supreme Court, the Solicitor General confessed error in
United States v. Vazquez‖).
127. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
128. Id. at 350.
129. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110.
130. E.g., United States v. Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x 386, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
131. E.g., United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Saucedo-Martinez, 323 F. App‘x 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hernandez-Funez, 307
F. App‘x 799, 800 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzales-Camacho, 301 F. App‘x 314, 315–16
(5th Cir. 2008); Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x at 387–88.
132. United States v. Tapia-Cortez, 327 F. App‘x 793, 796 (10th Cir. 2009).
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yet addressed the question.) The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument even
when made by defendants sentenced under the crack cocaine Guideline that
was specifically at issue in Booker.133 According to the Fifth Circuit,
Kimbrough did not address the presumption of reasonableness. It explained
that ―[a]lthough some language in Kimbrough could be read to support
appellant‘s argument . . . the square holding of Rita in favor of our
presumption sufficiently supports that presumption even in light of
Kimbrough.‖134 This reasoning seems suspect, and the court offered no
analysis to support it. Instead, the Fifth Circuit‘s position seems based, at
least in part, on a wish to avoid ―wholesale, appellate-level reconception of
the role of the Guidelines and review of the methodologies of the Sentencing
Commission.‖135 In suggesting that appellate review might be dependent
upon whether the Commission incorporated empirical data and national
experience when formulating individual Guidelines, the Kimbrough Court
appears to invite ―a piece-by-piece analysis of the empirical grounding behind
each part of the sentencing guidelines‖—an analysis that the Fifth Circuit
seems eager to avoid.136
The Tenth Circuit‘s justification for continuing to impose the presumption
of reasonableness for Guidelines that are without an empirical basis is more
troubling. The court noted that Kimbrough did not address the presumption of
reasonableness issue. 137 In addition, the court added that its ―presumption of
reasonableness is based on the purpose of promoting uniformity in
sentencing.‖138 This justification runs counter to the Supreme Court‘s opinion
in Rita, which ―appeared to deny that the presumption creates a legal bias for
within-Guidelines sentences, stating that the presumption has no ‗independent
legal effect‘ but merely reflects the reality that a within-Guidelines sentence is
likely to be reasonable.‖139 Although uniformity in sentencing remains an
important goal after Booker, as described below, uniformity may only be
furthered through certain means. Because the Booker Sixth Amendment
remedy was premised on the restoration of district court discretion, uniformity
may not be achieved through restricting that discretion; otherwise federal

133. See United States v. Garrett, 318 F. App‘x 294 (5th Cir. 2009).
134. Davila-Romero, 297 F. App‘x at 388.
135. Duarte, 569 F.3d at 530.
136. Id.
137. Tapia-Cortez, 327 F. App‘x at 796 (―Kimbrough does not bear on whether we should
apply our presumption of reasonableness. Kimbrough addressed whether the district court, in
exercising its discretion, was permitted to consider whether a Guideline has an empirical basis, and
the Supreme Court held that it was.‖).
138. Id. (citing United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006)).
139. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 21.
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sentencing risks running afoul of the Sixth Amendment doctrine identified in
Apprendi and its progeny.
V. PROMOTING UNIFORMITY IN THE WAKE OF KIMBROUGH
Underlying the U.S. Supreme Court‘s post-Booker cases and the conflict
in the circuits after Kimbrough is a fundamental tension between promoting
adherence to the Guidelines without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment. 140
Indeed, the result in Kimbrough, including the vague and conflicting dicta
regarding closer review, can be attributed to the precarious balance the Court
is attempting to strike between district court sentencing discretion and the
preservation of some adherence to the Guidelines through appellate review.
Until this tension is resolved, circuit conflict is destined to persist, and
repeated Supreme Court interventions may be necessary. One possible way to
resolve this tension is to promote district court acceptance of the content of
the Guidelines by encouraging the Commission to explain and (where
appropriate) revisit its policy decisions that have shaped the Guidelines.
There are various ways to promote district court compliance with the
Guidelines (and thus uniformity). One way is to simply require district courts
to impose within-Guideline sentences. This was the approach taken by
Congress in the SRA, and it is clearly incompatible with the Booker remedy to
the Sixth Amendment sentencing problem. A second approach would be for
district courts to defer to the Commission‘s judgments on how to best balance
the competing interests identified in § 3553(a). But, as the Court recently
held in Nelson v. United States,141 this is not permissible, presumably because
it also runs into the Sixth Amendment problem identified in Booker.
A third approach would be to ensure district court compliance through
appellate review. This is the approach that the Court appears to have
adopted. 142 Of course, close ―appellate review of substantive sentencing
policy determinations would functionally reinstate the mandatory system
condemned in Booker because it would inevitably result in binding legal rules
defining sentencing ranges.‖143 To avoid this, the Court adopted a more
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deferential form of appellate review: abuse of discretion. 144 But even this
more deferential standard of review is not without Sixth Amendment
problems. That is because, as I have explained elsewhere, appellate review is
by its nature a limitation on district court discretion. 145 Thus, in selecting the
restoration of district court discretion as the remedy in Booker for the Sixth
Amendment sentencing problem, the Court has created a situation where
limits on that discretion threaten to undermine the remedy and restore the
system the Court previously held to be unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Court appears unwilling to fully embrace a deferential form
of review. Presumably in an effort to promote adherence to the Guidelines,
the Court has included dicta in recent opinions that appear to endorse a more
stringent level of appellate review for non-Guidelines sentences. Kimbrough
provides one example. 146 Although the outcome in Kimbrough appeared to
affirm district court discretion, its dictum regarding closer review by appellate
courts for certain policy disagreements reveals the Court‘s unwillingness to
treat the Guidelines as truly advisory.
The suggestion that closer review may sometimes be appropriate also
raises Sixth Amendment problems. While the Kimbrough Court did not state
that district courts would be reversed in such situations, the mere fact that
Court has said the Guidelines must be and are advisory. Our substantive review of district court
sentences accordingly must be limited. Otherwise, the term ‗advisory‘ will lose all meaning, and the
Sixth Amendment problem with the Guidelines will persist.‖).
144. As I have previously explained:
De novo appellate review of substantive sentencing policy determinations
would functionally reinstate the mandatory system condemned in Booker
because it would inevitably result in binding legal rules defining sentencing
ranges. Deferential review largely avoids this problem. Instead of being called
upon to articulate rules about the appropriate sentencing range for particular
crimes, courts of appeals simply evaluate whether a policy determination by the
district court is reasonable. Holding that a particular determination is
reasonable does not make that determination binding. The approval of one
district court‘s policy as reasonable does not mean that other district courts, or
even the same district court, must apply that same policy in the future to similar
cases.
Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 30–31.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Gall provides another example. As I have previously noted:
[A]t the same time it purported to reject proportionality review, the [Gall] Court
stated that, ―[I]t [is] uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported
by a more significant justification than a minor one.‖ The Court made no effort
to resolve the tension between this statement—which encourages substantive
appellate review of sentences outside the Guidelines range—and the Court‘s
holding—which suggested that appellate courts should defer to district court
determinations.
Id. at 34 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).
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appellate courts will look more closely at those district court decisions that
disagree with Commission policy determinations may ultimately serve to
elevate the now-advisory Guidelines, in practice, to mandatory or binding
authority on district courts. As Fred Schauer has explained, optional (i.e.,
advisory) authorities, over time, are sometimes transformed into mandatory
ones. He gives the example of citation conventions:
Although the Tenth Circuit would be doing nothing wrong by
failing to cite to the Second Circuit in a securities case, the
failure to cite to the most prominent court on securities
matters would likely raise some eyebrows. And the higher
the eyebrows are raised, the more that what is in some sense
optional is in another sense mandatory. The more there is an
expectation of reliance on a certain kind of authority, the
more an authority passes the threshold from optional to
mandatory.147
In telling district courts that they will be subject to closer review—
appellate eyebrows will be raised—if they deviate from the Guidelines, the
Court has indicated that the Guidelines are in some sense mandatory authority
for district courts. In other words, if this dictum from Kimbrough creates an
―expectation of reliance‖ on the Guidelines, then they are no longer truly
advisory.148
Although the aforementioned methods for promoting district court
compliance with the Guidelines each appear to raise Sixth Amendment
concerns, there may be an alternative method that would promote sentencing
uniformity without limiting district court discretion (and thus without raising
Sixth Amendment concerns): Convince district courts that a within-Guidelines
sentence actually achieves the goals of sentencing in a particular case. So
long as a district court elects to impose within-Guidelines sentences because
the judge believes that the specific Guidelines range is premised on proper
policy considerations and provides an appropriate sentence in that case, then
that court will impose a sentence that furthers uniformity without implicating
the Sixth Amendment.
This approach may not seem particularly revolutionary—indeed, the
Supreme Court‘s repeated exaltations of the Guidelines and the Commission
likely represent efforts by some Justices (notably Justice Breyer) to encourage
district courts to impose within-Guidelines sentences. While it is compatible
with Sixth Amendment principles to attempt to persuade district courts to
sentence within the Guidelines, the manner in which the Court has sought to

147. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1958 (2008).
148. See id.
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persuade district courts to impose within-Guidelines sentences is problematic.
The Court occasionally implies that district courts ought to impose
Guidelines sentences because of the institutional advantages the Commission
enjoys.
This suggestion is implicit when the Court describes the
Commission‘s process for developing and revising the Guidelines in a
laudatory fashion, 149 or when it seeks to reassure district courts that the
Guidelines—in light of Congress‘s direction to the Commission—―reflect a
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)‘s
objectives.‖150 In each of these instances, the Court is attempting to persuade
district courts to impose within-Guidelines sentences. It attempts to do so by
insisting that the Commission, as an institution, is in the best position to make
decisions about generally applicable sentencing policy.151 But these attempts
at persuasion based on institutional strengths are appeals to authority, and thus
raise Sixth Amendment problems. This is because, if a district court were to
impose a within-Guidelines sentence merely because the Guidelines were
written by the Sentencing Commission, it would be no different than
presuming that a Guidelines sentence is correct, which the Court has
repeatedly explained is not permissible.152 District courts cannot simply defer
to the Commission and its Guidelines 153—that is, they cannot treat the
Guidelines as authoritative. 154
While attempting to convince district courts to impose within-Guidelines
sentences based on their source (i.e., the Commission‘s expertise) runs into
Sixth Amendment concerns, an attempt to convince based on the Guidelines‘
149. See supra note 57.
150. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007).
151. See id. at 348–50; Gall, 552 U.S. at 46; see also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163,
173 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)) (―Kimbrough
and Gall both emphasize that, after Booker, the Guidelines‘ claim on judicial respect derives from the
fact that the Sentencing Commission ‗has the capacity courts lack‘ to frame Guidelines on the basis
of ‗empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate
expertise.‘‖).
152. See cases cited supra note 141 and accompanying text.
153. See Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890 (2009). But see Rita, 552 U.S. at 357
(―Circumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission‘s own
reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence . . . in the typical case, and that the judge
has found that the case before him is typical.‖); Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines
(and Judges Be Judges), OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. AMICI : VIEWS FROM THE FIELD (Jan. 2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Lynch-final-12-28-07.pdf (―[T]he Commission‘s
advantage is in weighing broad social policy, and responsiveness to democratic political opinion. I
should, I believe, give them deference as to the appropriate starting point or typical sentence for the
average or typical instance of a given crime.‖).
154. Such deference would be based on the status of the institution that promulgated the
Guidelines rather than an independent evaluation of the content of the Guidelines. ―[T]he
characteristic feature of authority is its content-independence. The force of an authoritative directive
comes not from its content, but from its source.‖ Schauer, supra note 147, at 1935.
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content raises no such problems. A district court judge sentences based on
content rather than authority if she is convinced the substantive reasons
underlying a particular Guideline are appropriate and thus she elects to
impose a within-Guidelines sentence. Persuasion based on content raises no
Sixth Amendment problems because it still requires the sentencing judge to
evaluate the Commission‘s reasoning and reach her own independent
conclusion about the strength of that reasoning. 155 In sum, if a district court is
persuaded by the Commission‘s reasoning that the Guideline sentence is
appropriate, then uniformity is likely to be achieved while preserving district
court discretion.
Attempting to persuade district courts to impose within-Guidelines
sentences based on the content of the Guidelines would require some
heretofore uncharacteristic behavior from the Commission. The Commission
would have to reinvent itself as an institution designed to persuade district
courts rather than to dictate to them. 156 Prior to Booker, the Commission
rarely reacted to district court decisions imposing below-Guidelines sentences
by promulgating a new Guideline or policy statement that approved of such
sentencing reductions.157
Instead, the Commission would promulgate
Guidelines or policy statements designed to eliminate district court authority
to reduce sentences in such situations. 158 And despite repeated comments by

155. As Fred Schauer has explained:
A judge who is genuinely persuaded by an opinion from another jurisdiction is
not taking the other jurisdiction‘s conclusion as authoritative. Rather, she is
learning from it, and in this sense she is treating it no differently in her own
decisionmaking processes than she would treat a persuasive argument that she
has heard from her brother-in-law or in the hardware store. Conversely, the
judge who decides to treat a decision from another jurisdiction as worthy of
following because of its source and not its content is treating it as authoritative
and need not be persuaded by the substantive reasons that might have persuaded
the court that reached that decision.
Id. at 1943–44.
156. Cf. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 12 (1996) (―Some judges use words like
arrogant and hostile to describe the commission‘s attitude to the federal judiciary.‖).
157. One notable exception to this general practice concerns aberrant behavior. Initially
fashioned by courts out of little more than a passing reference in the Federal Sentencing Guideline
Manual, the Commission subsequently recognized that if an offense constituted ―aberrant behavior‖
by the defendant, then a downward departure may be appropriate. See Rachel A. Hill, Character,
Choice, and ―Aberrant Behavior‖: Aligning Criminal Sentencing with Concepts of Moral Blame, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 977 (1998); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20 (2008); see also
United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 79 (1st Cir. 2004).
158. See Christina Chiafolo Montgomery, Social and Schematic Injustice: The Treatment of
Offender Personal Characteristics Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 27, 37–43 (1993); Jean H. Shuttleworth, Childhood Abuse as a Mitigating
Factor in Federal Sentencing: The Ninth Circuit Versus the United States Sentencing Commission,
46 VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1344–45 (1993); TONRY, supra note 156, at 77.
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judges that the Guidelines ranges are too harsh,159 the Commission‘s
amendments to the Guidelines have—with few exceptions160—largely
increased those ranges. 161
In addition to historically ignoring the disagreement of district court
judges, the Commission has not made a serious effort to provide the reasoning
behind its Guideline decisions to district courts. 162 For example, as I have
noted elsewhere, in response to a number of court decisions awarding
sentence reductions for a defendant‘s prior good acts, the Sentencing
Commission adopted a Guideline stating that ―[m]ilitary, civic, charitable, or
public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good
works are not ordinarily relevant in determining‖ whether to impose a
sentence outside the Guideline range. 163 The Commission never provided an
official explanation for this new Guideline, and the Commission chairman and
general counsel later published a law review article stating baldly that the
Guideline was promulgated because courts were granting such departures
despite the ―‗Commission[‘s] intent that departures based on offender ―good
citizen‖ characteristics rarely would be appropriate.‘‖164 In other words, the
159. See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the
American
Bar
Association
Annual
Meeting
(Aug.
9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (―[T]he compromise that led
to the guidelines led also to an increase in the length of prison terms. We should revisit this
compromise. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised downward.‖); Susan R. Klein,
The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 736
(2005) (noting that ―[p]rosecutors realize that many judges think the Guidelines are too harsh,
especially for white collar and drug cases‖); Lynch, supra note 153, at 4 (―I suspect that a large
number, perhaps a majority, of judges believe that the overall sentencing pattern of the guidelines is
excessively severe.‖); see also TONRY, supra note 156, at 99 (noting ―the widespread hostility of
judges and lawyers to the federal sentencing guidelines,‖ and also noting that ―[t]he core objections
are that the guidelines are too rigid and too harsh‖).
160. One recent exception is the Commission‘s amendment to the crack cocaine Guideline.
See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100 (2007) (describing the 2007 Guideline amendment
that ―reduces the base offense level associated with each quantity of crack by two levels‖ and ―yields
sentences for crack offenses between two and five times longer than sentences for equal amounts of
powder‖) (citing Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg.
28,558, 28,571–72 (2007)).
161. See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 578 (―[S]ince enacting the original Guidelines,
the Commission has amended many of them, making them even more severe.‖); see also STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 14, at 64 (―As both Congress and the Commission subsequently provided for
increased sentence severity for a variety of crimes, the Commission‘s modest estimate in 1987 of the
impact of the Guidelines on total federal prison population quickly became out-dated.‖).
162. See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 65, at 580 (noting that an examination of a particular
Guideline ―will generally find that the guideline in question is based on neither past practice nor
Commission expertise and that the Commission has never persuasively justified it,‖ and that ―neither
the [Guidelines] manual nor the several other sources that may potentially contain useful information
are likely to include any material relating to the merits of the guideline‖).
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2008).
164. See Hessick, supra note 66, at 1120–21 (quoting William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer,

2009]

POST-KIMBROUGH APPELLATE REVIEW

747

Commission decided that it did not think certain mitigating factors were
appropriate, and so it promulgated a Guideline essentially forbidding district
courts from reducing sentences on that basis without ever explaining why the
Commission believed the mitigating factors to be inappropriate.
That the Commission largely elects not to provide reasons for its
Guideline decisions is likely attributable to Congress‘s decision not to subject
the Commission to those portions of the Administrative Procedure Act that
require agencies to explain their decisions. 165 While Booker did not add a
statutory requirement to provide explanations, it certainly appears to have
altered the practical effect that such explanations would have. Now that
district courts are free to disregard the Guidelines—including the policy
judgments contained therein—the Commission has an incentive to provide
such explanations in an attempt to convince district judges that a Guidelines
sentence is appropriate. In other words, if post-Booker, the Commission were
to respond to sentencing decisions by promulgating a Guideline stating that
certain mitigating factors were inappropriate, district courts now have the
discretion to disagree with that Guideline and reduce defendants‘ sentences.
But if the Commission were to explain why it believes those mitigating factors
to be inappropriate, then it might convince (at least some) district courts not to
reduce sentences on those grounds. In endeavoring to provide such an
explanation, the Commission may ultimately decide to revise those Guidelines
that are the subject of repeated district court disagreement166—an action that
would also help to promote uniformity.
Of course, using persuasion rather than appellate review or other limits on
district court discretion will necessarily allow some district courts to sentence
outside of the Guidelines. Under this proposal if, after reading the
Commission‘s explanation for a particular Guideline, a district judge remains
unconvinced that a Guidelines sentence is appropriate, then the judge is free
to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. The proposal does not provide for
substantive appellate review of such district court sentencing decisions, and so
non-Guidelines sentences will not be reversed. But the fact that district courts
will possess essentially unreviewable power to make sentencing decisions 167
does not necessarily mean that sentencing uniformity would, in practice, be
diminished. Indeed, if the Commission were to either justify or revisit its
The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 84 n.107 (1993)).
165. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 14, at 40, 208–09 n.20.
166. For example, ―many judges . . . disapprove of guideline[] provisions that forbid judges at
sentencing to take account of personal circumstances . . . .‖ TONRY, supra note 156, at 83.
167. Of course, pre-Guidelines limitations on such power—e.g., prohibitions on sentencing
based on race, United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994), or based on material
misinformation, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)—would still apply.
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more controversial Guidelines, then it may find that there is more district
court uniformity than reasonableness review by appellate courts can afford.
Several commentators have suggested that the Commission, in the wake
of Booker, engage in a dialogue with district court judges and revise the
Guidelines.168 The Commission‘s recent work revising the crack/powder
cocaine disparity suggests that the modern Commission might be more
amenable to such a suggestion.169 If the Commission were to adopt such an
approach with respect to other Guidelines, then the Guidelines amendments
would actually reflect ―national experience,‖ as the Court in Kimbrough
asserted the Guidelines do. 170 That dialogue and subsequent revisions might
promote uniformity without curtailing district court discretion (and thus
without raising Sixth Amendment problems) is yet another reason for the
Commission to continue down the path of revising the Guidelines. If
revisions were coupled with reasoned explanations of particular policy
decisions, we might also ultimately find ourselves with a federal sentencing
system that is perceived to be fair and sensible, as well as uniformly applied.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court‘s decision in Kimbrough was designed to clarify uncertainty

168. As Judge Nancy Gertner has suggested, the Commission should
continue to reexamine the Guidelines as it has done so well with the crack
Guidelines. It could look at those Guidelines that courts are having problems
with and reconsider them. That was the way the system was supposed to work:
sentencing departures by trial judges would highlight the area in which
Guideline change was needed. It could begin to provide real findings for the
Guidelines, rather than the cursory explanations. . . . In short, the Commission
could effectively redesign its mission as buttressing and supporting judicial
discretion and not just blocking it.
Nancy Gertner, Gall, Kimbrough and Me, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. AMICI: VIEWS FROM THE FIELD 5–6
(Jan. 2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/blog/Articles_1/Final2-Gertner-edit-1-18-08.pdf.
For
another example, see Michael S. Tunink, A New Role for the United States Sentencing Commission
in Post-Booker Sentencing: Reflecting Judicial Practice, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1429, 1430, 1442–49
(2008) (suggesting that the Commission ―develop a framework that establishes a dialogue between
the Commission and the judiciary by incorporating departures and variances as amendments to the
Guidelines in an attempt to reflect current judicial sentencing practice [and that] the Commission
should further cultivate judicial compliance by articulating the specific penalogical reasons for the
existing Guidelines and for each subsequent amendment to the Guidelines‖). Cf. TONRY, supra note
156, at 90 (recommending pre-Booker that the Commission revisit its policy decisions and fashion
guidelines ―that would reduce sentencing disparities but not routinely require judges to impose
sentences that they consider unjust‖).
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
170. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007); see also Tunink, supra note 168, at
1430 (arguing that if the Commission began ―incorporating departures and variances as amendments
to the Guidelines in an attempt to reflect current judicial sentencing practice,‖ then it will result in a
sentencing system ―arguably closer to that envisioned by the drafters of the SRA than that which
existed before Booker‖).

2009]

POST-KIMBROUGH APPELLATE REVIEW

749

surrounding the new form of appellate sentencing review established in
Booker. It appears, however, that Kimbrough may have actually resulted in
more appellate uncertainty. Some of this uncertainty is attributable to the
Court‘s dicta suggesting the level of appellate scrutiny of district court
disagreement with Guidelines‘ policy may depend on whether a particular
Guideline is the product of ―empirical data and national experience.‖ 171 But,
even without such dicta, appellate review of district court sentencing
decisions is likely to occur differently in different circuits. That is because the
Booker remedy—solving the Sixth Amendment problem by restoring district
court discretion while, at the same time, seeking to preserve some adherence
to the Guidelines through appellate review—is internally inconsistent and thus
inherently unstable.172 Some circuits are inevitably going to prioritize one
facet of the Booker remedy over the other, and thus circuit conflict is likely to
continue.
Because appellate review is fundamentally at odds with the concept of
district court discretion, this Article proposes appellate review is not the best
way to promote uniform sentencing. Instead, it proposes that the Commission
attempt to persuade district courts that the policy decisions underlying the
Guidelines are correct. To do so, the Commission will have to articulate its
reasoning for particular decisions. The Commission may also have to revise
those Guidelines that are the subject of widespread district court disapproval.
If district courts were to impose within-Guidelines sentences because they
were convinced such sentences were just, then we might attain not only
sentencing uniformity, but also a sentencing system that is perceived as fair.
And that would be a real accomplishment for federal sentencing.

171. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
172. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 6, at 33.

